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Labour market flexibility and the quali 
of work: a case study of the retail indust 
The view that labo.ur market flexibility will lead to benefits for everyone is far 
obvious. This paper analyse.s changes in retailing over the last decades. It fiM 
that much flexibility has been achieved in the .industry. Recent legislative chan .. 
have played an important role in these changes. Processes of deskillie& 
cas,ualization, juuenaliza.tion and feminization are being intensified. The effects • 
the quality of working life for retail .workers are examined. It is found that rel8il 
workers are having to pay a high price for the flexibilities achieved by their 
employers. 
1. Introduction 
A frequent assertion of the Business Roundtable and other employer lobby groups is 
that New Zealand has an inflexible labour market. Research by Harbridge and 
(1989), lhe Planning Council (1986) and others has cast severe doubt on the truth of dliJ 
claim. Nonethel~ess, as Dannin (1990) shows, employer rep~esentatives continue to 
this assertion in public (Treasury., 1984, 1987). The Reserve Bank and leading 
of both the Labour and National Parties have also joined in the call for more labour 
market flexibility. More flexibility is one of the aims of the Employment Contracts BiD 
currently befor·e Parliament. Despite the imminence of the Bill, and the frequency willa 
which calls for more flexibility are made, the exact benefits of more flexibility are nover 
spelt out. Nonetheless, it is usually asserted that a more flexible labour market will lead 
to an improv~ed national econo.mic performance, reflected in an improved b'QA""'•c~ 
payments, reduced unemployment and less inflationary pressures. 
The proponents of these views rarely, if ever, examine the consequences for workeD 
of more flexibility. If the flexibilities sought by employers do indeed produce more jobs 
and economic growth, then there is potential for benefits to accrue to the working class. 
But the question which remains, and which is never answered, is how these gains, if they 
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do occur, are to be shared out. Given the silence on this issue we have to be sceptical 
that there are any ben~efits for workers in a more flexible labour market since the 
flexjbilities sought by employers nearly all involve losses for working people. Weekend 
and night working, less secure employment, intensification of work, and wages set in 
line with employers' ability to pay mean a lower quality of work for those workers forced 
to accept these flexibilities and it would require both a very substantial increase in output, 
and a massive redistribution of income to compensate these work~ers. 
This paper will not be able to address all the issues raised in the flexibility debate, I 
but it attempts to shed some light on the question of how a more flexible labour market 
affects the quality of work. The retail sector is used as a case study. The retail industry 
is a particularly apposite case since it has already provided many of the flexibilities 
sought by employers in other sectors. Wages have declined relative to other indqstries; 
;; the J?ro~ortion of casual employees has increased substantially; and opening hours have 
been progressively liberalized until now shops can open almost ·continuously. Tiespite 
this degree of flexibility, many segments of the industry are in a perilous state. The 
paper will examine the factors responsible for the industry's ailing condition, and the 
consequences of this for those who work in the industry. 
The paper is organized into 2 .main parts. It begins by ~examining the dynamics of 
the industry, the tendency towards deskilling some sections of the work force, the pay 
structure., and the changes to shop trading hours . The second part draws on the work of 
the Second Sw.eating Commission (1990) and looks at the consequence of these changes 
for the quality of work, and examines job satisfaction, casualization, juvenalization, 
feminization, health and safety, and fmally, prospects for the future. 
2. The dynamics of the New Zealand retailing industry 
Retailing is a vast industry, divided into sub-sectors, which are not easy to define. In 
this paper, we restrict the analysis to retailing from the various types of "store" or "shop" 
but a broader definition of the industry would include restaurants, hotels, service stations, 
and mail order houses. The major division of the industry, as we are defining it is into 
food and non-food stor~es. This division is reflected in the award structure, for the main 
awards in the industry are the Grocery and Supeuuarket Award and the Non-food Award. 
The other major award is the Butchers Award .. Besides these awards, there are av.'ards for 
fish shops, cake shops, pharmacies, fruit and vegetable shops, dairies and mixed 
businesses. 
Although the awards do distinguish between different types of store, the divisions are 
far from clear cut. Many non-~ood stores sell food items. Super1narkets and dairies sell a 
wide range of non-food items. Pharmacies sell a wide range of general goods. What is 
more, the picture is never static as individual shops expand their lines into new areas, and 
abandon old ones. 
The lines carried by individual stores :is only one source of change, for retailing is a 
dynamic industry which is being restructured continuously. ~Changing ownership, new 
products, new methods of selling, ~competition from other forms of consumption, and the 
increasing involvement of r~etail real estat~e companies g~enerate n·ew patterns of 
competition. These changes impact on the retail labour force which is continuously 
resegmented as these changes transfonn the organization of shops and the retail labour 
process. The internationalization of the economy plays a major part in this as foreign 
operators introduce new labour practices and new products. Competition with imports 
alters profitability and pay levels and these seriously affect the quality of work for retail 
workers. 
1 These will be addressed in a forthcoming book P. Brosnan (ed.) Labour market flexib.ility 
in New Zealand. 
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The industry 
New Zealand's small population limits the retail market and the relatively large area 
and djspersion of population increases the difficulties of supplying that market. The 
developm,ent of the economy has significantly influenced the industry. The small scale of 
New Zealand manufacturing, and the syste.m of import licensing that prevailed until the 
1980s, meant that most stores were reliant on the same suppli,ers. As happened 
elsewhere (Rubery et al., 1987) the relative smallness of many stores and chains reduced 
their power in relation to suppliers. Stores normally paid the same wholesale prices and 
the award system equalized wage rates. Thus all stofes had similar cost structures and 
price differences were rafie or insignificant Competition between stores was based more 
on location, advertising, window display, service or the availability of credit. Trading 
hours were restricted to 40 hours per week from 1945 which, as we discuss below, 
influenced patterns of shopping and store location. 
The major sectors of the New Zealand retail industry are highly monopolistic. The 
largest 4 operators in the major sectors of the industry employ more than half of the 
labour torce and account tor more than half the sales in that sector. Even the sectors 
which are noted for their low pay, such as toy and novelty shops (Brosnan and 
Wilkinson, 1989, table 8), have a few employers controlling most of the sales and 
~employment of the sector. Mergers and tak~eovers are continually changing the structme, 
but the industry is probably more concentrated now than it has ever been. 
~Changes in products, consumer tastes, labour fo~ce behaviour, and government 
policy have all interacted to alter the pattern of shops and shopping. Whereas most major 
retailers had once been family fmns, the last decades have seen the descendants of the 
original owners selling their interests to corporate proprietors. These corporations, in 
turn, have changed operations, .merged with other corporations not always involv,ed in 
retailing, and resold stores as strategic opportunities presented themselves.. One 
consequence of the ·changes in ownership has been the decline of paternalism and the 
replacement of family managers, but it has also meant less job security for workers. 
These chang~es have accelerated in the last decade as importing has been freed up and 
permitted trading hours have been ~extended. The factors responsible for the 
lransfounation of retailing hav,e been similar to those listed by Bluestone and Stevenson's 
study of retailing in the United States: "'virulent competition ... following th,e 
introduction of the discount mode; r~evolutionary change in ownership patterns ... ; and 
sweeping changes wrought by technological advances'' (1981, p. 25-26). 
The proc·ess of ~change, however, has intensified ov~er the last 5 years. The retail 
sector has suffered very badly as a result of government policy. Various components of 
lhe Labour Government's policies directly affected the retail industry: the freeing up of 
importing, the removal of restrictions on foreign ownership, the liberalization of shop 
trading hours, reductions in real incomes and changes to the industrial relations system. 
The process of change unleashed by all these factors has been hastened further by the 
severe ~economic downturn which has flowed from these and other government policies. 
The result has been fierce competition in many segments of the market with severely 
eroded profit margins and a ~consequent deterioration of pay and conditions for work~ers in 
the industry. Six specific factors are perpetuating the pernicious competition in the 
industry: (a) slow growth in consumer demand (b) over supply (c) cost incfeases (d) poor 
sites (e) imports and (f) corporate weakness. 
Slow growth in consum·er demand 'The real volume of retail trade has 
declined by more than 10 percent over the last 15 years. Minimal population growth has 
left the number of consumers more or less unchanged. Alternativ~e forms of 
consumption, such as restaurants, gambling, tourism, and general ~entertainment have 
dev,eloped strongly. Most important of all, there has been little growth in disposable 
• 1ncome. 
1 ..._ - - - - - -- - --
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The level and distribution of income has had real effects on retail sales. The massive 
growth in unemployment has contributed to a substantial decline in consumption. At the 
sa)ne time, real wages have fallen and, furthermore, there has been a substantial 
redistribution of income from the lower paid to the higher paid (Brosnan and Wilkinson, 
1989). Given the greater propensity to save of the more wealthy, it was inevitable that 
this redistribution, plus the overall decline in incomes, would induce a fall in retail sales. 
This decline in demand has intensified the level of competition between stores, between 
chains, indeed even between different types of store, for the shrinking consumer dollar. 
Over supply Most sectors of the retail industry are highly competitive within the 
sector, and increasingly they face competition from other sectors, including manufacturers 
and growers who sell direct to the public. Patterns of trade are changing within retailing 
too. Thus, supeunarkets now sell hardware; some pharmacies sell clothes; packed meat 
is available at dairies while service stations sell newspapers, magazines, milk, bread and a 
variety of other foodstuffs. At the same time, deparunent stores have conceded market 
share to specialty stores. Thus, for example, the hardware section of most deparunent 
stores has been reduced drastically, while many deparunent stores have given up selling 
paint or wallpaper. The only limit to this process is a legal requirement that pharmacies 
be owned by qualified pharmacists, but supe1111arket owners and other retailers are 
lobbying to have this law changed so that they can extend their services into prescription 
medicines. 
Official data on retail sales, presented in table 1, highlight this shift in sales by store 
type. The table shows declines in real turnover for most types of store while chemists 
and supennarkets have experienced real increases. The vastly increased share of sales by 
these types of store reflects their extension from traditional products to a very wide range 
of melichandise. Supet tnarkets increased their share of all retail sales during the 1980s 
from 24.0 percent to 38.8 percent and chemists experienced a similar increase from 3.8 
percent to 6.3 percent. All other sectors apart from hardware and household appliances 
had their shares reduced, the greatest decline being for deparunent stores whose share 
dropped from 11.7 percent to 8.5 percent, and butchers whose share fell from ov~er 3.6 
percent to below 2.9 percent 
Other changes relate to the nature of retailing real estate. With the restricted trading 
hours available until 1980, malls, i.e. cover~ed shopping centres, were not such an 
attractive form of retail r~eal estate.2 There were some malls nevertheless, and these 
benefited greatly from the advent of Saturday shopping in 1983. As Saturday shopping 
developed, new and larger malls were built. Thus the proportion of retailing captur~ed by 
malls increased and the traditional "ribbon" shopping declined 
The development of the mall concept has seen the role of the developer/landlord 
expand to become a principal actor in detetnlining the availability of shops and shopping. 
Before the advent of the modern mall, retail landlords played almost no part in the 
industry as such. They merely took rent off shops. Now, mall owners deliberately set 
out to create a unique retailing environment within their mall and are selective in tei ans of 
whom they accept as tenants. Rents are set as a percentage of turnover. 'Thus the mall 
owner has an interest in both the standard of the mall and its mix of shops. Furthetnaore, 
shops with low turnover, and therefore low rents, will not usually have their leases 
renewed. These mall owners usually set trading hours for the mall as a whole, and the 
usual requirement of the leases is that all shops have to be open while the mall is open. 
Thus mall owners are indirectly adding to the competition betw~een shops. 
2 In fact, the introduction of restricted hours earlier this century saw the demise of malls that 
had been built in the nineteenth century. 
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Table 1: Percentage change in retail sales (c0,nstant dollar values) 
Store type 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 
Butchers -14.1 -6.4 -43.6 
Supennarkets/Grocers 8.2 13.4 2.4 
Other food 0.0 16.2 -33.2 
Footwear 1.9 -8.0 -45.6 
Clothing and textiles -17.8 -14.8 -16.8 
Furniture -9.4 -4.8 -27.9 
Household appliances -2.1 21.8 -24.4 
Hardware -6.9 5.5 -12.7 
Chemists 3.7 5.6 10.9 
Department and General -15.6 ·-3.5 -36.2 
Other 1.4 -1.9 7.9 
Total -3.2 3.3 -11.4 
Source: Monthly abstract of statistics. 
This process of intense competition is continually augmented by the entry of new 
types of stores in to the industry, and the ~expansion of existing stores into new lines. 
Entry to the industry is relativ~ely easy, and fringe retailing can make substantial 
differences to the sales of some lines. Ironically, the economic downturn while reducing 
demand for retail goods has also added to the stock of shops, for a significant number of 
older, redundant workers, especially from the State sector, hav~e used their redundancy 
settlements to ~enter the retail trade as owner operators of small shops. 
Where these fringe operators are self employed, they also indirectly affect working 
conditions. They often impose long hours on themselves, and may sacrifi,ce immediate 
income ~or capital growth or the development of goodwill. If they employ staff, they 
may demand similar lev~els of commiunent from them. Either way, they p!iovide a fotan 
of low wage competition for larger fuans which may lead to a worsening of conditions for 
the staff in those fira ns too. 
The most severe competition has come from Australian fmns such as K-Mart, Just 
Jeans, Country Road., and Fletcher Jones which have entered the New Zealand market in 
the last 5 years. These Australian fir.ans have acquired or built quality shops. Cole 
Meyers, reputed to be one of the largest grocery companies in the world, is the largest of 
the Australian finns. It has only been operating in New Zealand since 1988, but, 
through its acquisitions, it controls about 14 percent of the New Zealand food market. Its 
K-Marts are a new entry into the northern non-food market Another Australian funa, 
Dairy Farm,3 recently acquired the Nathan group of supeunarkets (Woolworths, Big Fresh 
and Associated Wholesalers) which control a further 18 percent of the market. These 
Australian operators, having the advantage of their links to Australian suppliers, are well 
placed to compete in both the wholesale and Jetail markets, and can demand high standards 
and favourable prices from New Zealand suppliers. 
These Australian frrms are already making an impact on working conditions as they 
endeavour to implement .Australian working conditions. They are being selective in this 
3 Dairy Farm, a list·ed subsidiary of Hong Kong based Jardine Matheson, owns Australia's 
third largest chain, Franklins, and has supermarkets in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. 
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though. Where Australian conditions are superior, e.g. annual leave, they prefer to apply 
New Zealand conditions. 
Cost increases Many stor~es had negotiated their leases before 1987 when demand 
for real estate, and there~ore the level of rents, was very high. Despite adjustn}ents 
downwards in rents since then, most stores are stuck with leases that are more favourable 
to their landlords than themselves. On top of this, the entry of redundant workers into 
the retail sector has kept up the demand for shop leases, and kept rents at a level which 
may otherwise not have been sustained 
This shift in demand further hurt many downtown stores which already ~experienced 
high costs on account of their location. Many of them are located in old buildings, 
unsuited to modern ttading. In addition, they use highly valued real estate which, in 
recent years, has added to their tax. liabilities as land tax has been incfeased and the basis 
of local body rates recalculated. 
The decline in economic activity has meant shorter production runs and higher 
average costs for manufacturers which has, in turn, increased wholesale prices for 
retailers. Other factors are adding to costs too- for example, the vastly increased use of 
cr~edit cards, with a high percentage cost per transaction and a delay· in receipt of the 
payment. Other non-traditional means of payment, such as electronic funds transfer 
(EFT) hav~e also been expensive and the retailer's cost for EFf has been a continuing 
sotWce of dispute between retailers and the banks. 
Poor sites Changes brought about by Saturday trading ar,e still having their effect 
on the geographic concentration of demand FurthetlllOfe, other dynamic forces have been 
relocating the pattern of shopping. This has left a significant number of stores, 
particularly deparunent stores left in sites with r,educed "pedestrian counts". The leasing 
system, tradition, and underfunding has nonetheless caused these stores to remain on these 
less profitable sites. 
Imports Some segments of the industry have been taking advantage of the 
liberalization of imports to do their own importing. The perceived cost savings, though, 
have generally turned out oo be illusory. These fu nts have discovered that shipping is 
more specialized and delays more ,common than they suspected. 
A recent development following the liberalization of imports has been the opening of 
disposal outlets or "direct import" stofes which sell a limited range of low quality 
products, usually from third world ~countries, directly from packing cases. These shops 
usually locate in temporary premises, awaiting demolition. Their low rents, zero 
warehousing costs and minimal marketing give them considernble cost advantages over 
their technologically superior competitors. 
Better established stores are making more use of alternative sources of imports too. 
But again the benefits ar~e turning out to be illusory. High failur~e rates in alternative 
importing can tum an appar~ent profit to .a loss. Nevertheless, the competition between 
imports and locally produced products has further squeezed profit margins in both 
categories. 
Corporate weakness Many of the invesunent companies which were wiped out 
in the 1987 stock market crash had acquired retail companies for their portfolios. Most of 
these retail companies had been ~experiencing difficulties prior to acquisition- hence the 
ease of the initial takeover - but they are compounded by the now inadequate financial 
base of the parent companies. Although a series of mergers and takeovers is restructuring 
the ownership of the industry., many of the financial problems remain. 
The response of management to all these difficulties has been to try to survive by 
competing on the basis of price. This has been accompanied in the non-food sector by 
~escalatory advertising. The results are reductions in gross margins with even greater 
Flexibility io the retail industry 19 
reductions in net margins. This competitive scramble has trimmed profits below 
sustainable levels. Small specialist shops whi~ch are able to exploit market niches are 
able to mak·e satisfactory profi'ts. But the chains and bigger shops are making losses. 
Although average margins in the non-food sector are in the range 20 to 30 percent 
(compared to about 30 to 40 percent 5 years ago), net margins are currently negative for 
many stores. The food sector is doing a little better. Its gross margins are in the range 4 
to 18 percent which yields a net margin after tax of 2 to 3 percent for the better quality 
supern~•arkets and 0.5 to 0 .. 75 percent for the .majority. 
The more successful retailers are endeavouring to compete on the basis of service, 
product quality and the attractiveness of their stores. Nonetheless, they still face 
competition from disposal outlets which can offer considerably cheaper goods, and they 
face many increased costs unrelated to their central operations (e.g . rent). Adjustments are 
being made by suppliers too. Some transnationals are buying back their New Zealand 
subsidiaries, or amalgamating them with the Australian subsidiary, with the aim of 
standardizing their products. They ar.e also rationalizing the number of stores they 
supply. The outcome is likely to be more orderly marketing and better service at the top 
end of the market but many of the structural problems of the industry will remain for 
some time. 
The restructuring of the industry itself is only one aspect of chang~e. The last 4 
decades have seen a restructuring of stor~es themselv~es. This has changed the nature of 
shop work and has effectively deskilled a significant portion of the labour force. 
Deskilling creates the possibility of reducing pay further and using more casual and 
teenage labour. As Bluestone and Stevenson (1981) suggest, this deskilling arises 
ldirectly from employers' attempts at cost cutting. With the growth of self service, and 
the concomitant development of specialist advertising., the skills of expert sales staff are 
no longer essential. It ther~efore became easier to use untrained ~casual and part time 
workers, especially if they work alongside more experienced staff who can handle the 
more technical enquiries or do complex paperwork. ~Credit cards and EFf further r~educe 
the responsibility of the assistant who once played an important role within the store's 
system of customer credit. Simultaneously, bar coding of products and modem cash 
registers eliminate most of the mathematical skills. 
Beyond the cash register, mass advertising by manufacturers reduces the amount of 
selling that needs to be done by sales workers. Thus mass production and mass 
advertising have gone hand in hand with the cash-and-carry style of store. But their 
impact extends to other types of store too. If advertising is successful, customers enter a 
store looking for a particular product and the shop assistant's job often consists only of 
helping to find that product. if help is even needed, and in taking the customer's payment 
for the product Store advertising augments this process; products advertised by the store 
will be plac~ed prominent! y and the sales assistant's job is reduc~ed to operating the cash 
) register. Thus deskilling, as well as producing a downward pressure on pay, provides 
e.mployers with many of the .flexibilities that they seek in using more casual labour. 
Deskilling is not confined to the sales assistants. Branch manager·s jobs are 
deskilled at least as much. One of the main reasons for introducing bar coding was to 
simplify and improv.e the level of stock control at the branch level (Smith, 1988). With 
centralized computer control, stock management was r~emoved from the branch altogether. 
Branch managers have also lost responsibility for most other features of their stores with 
pric~es, product lines, sto~e layout, promotions, and staff budgets all being detetinined 
centrally. Their primary responsibility devolv~es, the11efore, to staff supervision and ·even 
this is usually delegated to supervisors (Smith, 1988) .. 
' 
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There are limits to this deskilling process, however, because some segments of the 
industry place a premium on service and product knowledge. At the luxury end of the 
mark·et, the total product being marketed is not just the commodity traded but also the 
experience of shopping. Thus the sales assistant's knowledge., manner and appearanc·e 
become integral parts of the product's perception, and even part of the product itself. The 
need to have knowledgeable, charming sales staff cuts across the ability of employers to 
complet·ely deskill the retail labour force but, at the same time it segments the labour 
force. 
Nonetheless, deskilling of some segments of the industry has effects on other 
segments since the award structure is based on a basic rate for the whole industry. Thus, 
as some of the work becam·e deskilled, the perception of retail work changed from that of 
a semiskilled job to one which any moderately numerate person could do, and the pay 
became lower than that in almost any other industry. Nonetheless, pay is not clearly 
r ~elated to the degree of skill, for pay rates are higher in the supe1111arket sector (table 3 
below4) which has been deskilled more significantly than the non-food sector. Moreover 
it is not clear that deskilling is the key to profitability. Smith (1988), in a British study, 
found that stores which retained a .more traditional labour process were as profitable as 
those which had significantly deskilled. 
At the top end of the market, workers are employed under differ.ent tetnts. Thus, 
cosmetic companies sometimes have their own ~employees sell cosmetics in department 
stores - and on a higher wage than the other cosmetic sales staff, despite the number of 
"badg~es" they might have earned. The closer the cosmetic company wants to be to the 
top end of the .market, the mor~e likely they are to adopt this strategy,. 
These changes have implications for careers in the industry. Managers, clerical staff 
and shop assistants are seen as comprising distinct segments of the retail labour market 
Especially in the food sector, shop assistants comprise a secondary labour market. They 
are seen as unskilled and the mobility is generally restricted between packer, shelf filler, 
checkout operator and ancillary jobs such as trolley collector. Even here there is a gender 
division of labour in that most checkout operators are female while most shelf fill,ers are 
male. To the extent that there is any promotion, it is to jobs such as checkout 
controller, or price controller: Managers are recruited in a separate labour market, and 
although they may spend some time as checkout operators, this work is regarded as 
training or familiariza'tion. The assistants are generally ~emale, part time, and from all 
age groups. Manage:ment trainees are young, full time and male. 
There is less segmentation in the non-food sector. At the top end of t.he market, 
·where experience and product knowledge are important, it is possible for shop assistants 
to become supervisors or buyers. The National Certificate in Retailing is available to 
workers seeking a career in the industry but the scope for advancement is limited 
nonetheless. With the growth of large chains, skills such as buying are not needed at 
branch level. Accounting, or other tertiary qualifications, may provide a better route to 
management. The lower ~end of the non-food sector is being increasingly modelled on the 
food sec'tor.. Thus lhe opportunities for advancem~ent in the non-food sector remain very 
limited for most workers. 
Trade union organization 
The retail unions have a long history. The earliest associations of shop work~ers 
were founed to achieve some control over shop opening hours. Butchers unions were 
4 The difference preceded the 1990-91 wage roun<L when the non-food award rate was not 
increased. The reader will note from table 3 that, even after allowing for the 2 percent 
increase in the supermarket sector, achieved in the 1990-91 round .. wages in the non-food 
sector are noticeably lower. 
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fanned in the late 1880s. A ,grocers union was probably fo1n1ed about the same time 
(Hince et al., 1'990). After compulsory unionism was introduced in 1936. the unions 
gained large numbers of members, and were able to achieve a significant financial base. 
As Hince et aL (1990) point out, however, the unions were never very well organized nor 
very active. In some respects, this reflected the conservatism of the membership, but it 
also derived from the stultifying effect of the industrial conciliation and arbitration system 
and compulsory unionism. From the 1970s, the unions started to rebuild and a series of 
amalgamations led to the fornaation of the 2 unions as they are at present. 
The 2 major unions which represent retail workers are the Northern Distribution 
Union and the New Zealand (except Northern) Distribution and G,eneral Workers Union. 
The Northern Union covers workers north of Taupo and the New Zealand Union workers 
south of Taupo. These 2 unions also represent drivers and store workers in some 
districts. ~ogether with some r,egionat drivers unions and stofes unions, they belong to 
the Distribution Workers Federation. The 2 unions are organized into regional branches 
and they have special structures for r,etaiJ workers within them. 
Unions of retail workers face immense organizational difficulties. With over 
100,000 workers spread over tens of thousands of work places, it is impossible for 
organizers to visit each site on a regular basis. These difficulties are highlighted by the 
data in table 2 which show the size distribution of retail sites organized by the Northern 
Distribution Union. The situation is worse than this, since the union will be unaware of 
some of the smallest sites. These difficulties are compounded by the high rate of 
turnover in some sectors of the industry. Official statistics feveal that turnover in the 
industry has increased relative to the all industry average during the 1980s. The retail rate 
of terminations was 41 peroent in 1980 when the all-industry rate was 42 percent. By 
1988, the all-industry rate had dropped to 33 percent but the retail rate held up at 38 
percent (Quarterly Employment Survey). 
Table 2: Retail sites organized by the Nor,thern Distribution Union 
Members Number of sites 
1-5 
5-15 
16-50 
51-100 
100+ 
Source: S,econd New Zealand Sweating Commission (1990, p.33). 
7211 
1'81 
112 
37 
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The difficulties faced by the unions have been compounded by the State's withdrawal 
from the inspection and en:Corcement of awards. Organization will be almost impossible 
if the provisions of the Employment ,Contracts Bill are enacted. 'This is particularly 
serious considering that the Second Sweating ,Commission (1990) uncovered a strong, 
almost obsessive anti-unionism among retail employers. This was strongest among the 
owners of small shops who resented any intrusion of ''outsidersu into the affairs of their 
business. But it was also eviden:t in the attitude of management in some large chains 
too. 
The increasing casualization of the industry is a further problem. Ev~en when union 
organizers can meet casual workers, they find it difficult to convince them that they 
' 
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should join the union (the union membership clause notwithstanding). Total union 
membership is approximately 38,000 out of an official retail work force of 102,000 
(approximately 37 percent). Unions therefore face a strategic choice, to concentrate on 
the large sites, where the majority of members work, or to respond to complaints and to 
limit their role to essentially a fire fighting one. Either way, professional union staff are 
not able to fully service the :membership by themselves. Thus an effective system of lay 
officials is crucial to the union. But even lay officials cannot cope with the problem of 
so many small shops - which afe often the very ones least likely to honour the award. 
Pay rates 
Retailing has always had pay rates towards the lowest ~end of the industry wage 
distribution, but the last decade has seen pay rates decline substantially compared with 
other indus·tries. Nonetheless, the award system has operated to provide some floor to 
wages and to provide some structllfe in a complex industry. In the less competitive era 
that prevailed before the 1970s, the award system was largely accepted by employers; the 
rates set out in the awards, although only minimums, became the paid rates. Thus wage 
costs through out the industry were more or less standardized. 
The other effect of the award system was to restrict the extent of commission selling. 
Since award rates had to be paid whatever the level of sales in the shop, or whatever the 
perfo1tnance of the individual salesperson, commission selling could only be effective 
where ·the award wage constituted a minimum guarantee and total commission would 
greatly exceed that. Thus commission selling was mainly restricted to whiteware, 
brownware and electronic appliances where the value of each sale is high, and the 
knowledge and skill of the salesperson is crucial to the sale. This end of the market has 
remained a largely male dominated segment 
Shop size played a major part in the attitude of employers towards the award. The 
award was more likely to be breached in small shops. Although the major stores 
negotiated the award and always attempted to keep rates as low as possible, most of them 
observed most aspects of the award, especially the prescribed pay rates. After all, the 
publicity surrounding a prosecution for an award breach, in what was a low wage 
industry, would be bad for business. The large employers also used their dominance of 
awaro negotiations to gain further advantages for themselves . s 
The low average hourly earnings in retailing, the lowest of any industry in New 
Zealand (Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1989, table 8), are partly a consequence of the youth 
rates in the retail awards, and the consequent juvenalization of the industry, which we 
discuss below. They also highlight, however, the fact that retailing has among the 
lowest awards for adult workers too. As examples, Brosnan and Wilkinson (1989, table 
18) noted that phannacists' assistants in the Northern Industrial District had an award with 
an adult rate which was no more than the statutory minimum wage. They noted that the 
adult rate in the Cake Shop Employees award was only $23 a week above the minimum 
wage. 
An idea of the Cllffent rates in the 2 main retail awards is giv~en in table 3. The table 
shows how low are dle rates ~or all categories of retail worker compared to the avenge 
hourly rate for all industries of $14 . 07. Even branch manag·ers are poorly paid. As the 
table shows, after 10 years service, branch managers in the non-food sector are entitled to 
only $9.79 an hour . 
5 This was highlighted in the .Kiwi House case, where the owner of a small tourist shop 
challenged the legality of the .award's negotiation .as only large employers were 
represented in the ·conciliation council. 
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Table 3: Rates in retail awards: March 1991 
Assistants 
Under 16i 
16i to17 
20 or over 
, 
Departmental manager 
(with buying responsibilities) 
18 or 19 
20 or over 
20-21 
Branch manager 
In charge of 6 
or more assistants 
Branch manager 
In charge of 20 
or more assistants 
Branch ·manager 
(after 10 years' service) 
In charge of 20 
or more assistants 
Non-food 
3.67 
3.89 
6.93 
6.08 
8.76 
9.37 
9.37 
9.79 
Grocery and 
supennarkets 
3.86 
3.86 
6.60 
7.23 
8 . 03 
8.03 
9.72 
10.99 
11.42 
Source: Second New Zealand Sw,eating Commission, 1990. 
Butchers 
4.38 
4.80 
8.16 
-
-
-
9.55 
9.55 
10.29 
Payment of above award wages, except for workers selling on commission, appears 
to be rare outside the Auckland area. Even in Auckland, abov,e award wages seems to be 
only available to male workers. The only women who appear to receive abov,e award 
wages work in specialist boutiques or sell top of the range cosmetics in department stores 
(paid by lhe cosm,etics company) or phaJanacies (Second New Zealand Sweating 
Commission, 1990). There is no clear link between the status associated with certain 
stores and the wage levels in those stores (Carter and Caner, 1985). For example, the 
Christchurch store Ballantynes attempts to project an image of superiority, but does not 
pay high wag~es and strongly resists any attempt at unionization.6 
The Second Sweating Commission (1990) found that underpayment was a not 
insignificant problem in smaller shops. Given the difficulties that unions have 
organizing in small shops, the extent of underpayment may be more significant than the 
Commission was able to detettnine. 
6 The Second Sweating Commission heard that Ballantynes gave staff time off on pay to 
wave to the Queen when she toured New Zealand. Nonetheless the frrm has consistently 
refused to giv~e s'taff time off to attend union meetings even though this right is ,guaranteed 
by law (Evidence presented, 8 February 1990}. 
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Table 4: Percentage increases in award rates: 1987-90 
Year 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
Non-food 
7.5 
3.5 
4.0 
Grocery 
aOO 
supetlnarkets 
7.5 
4.0 
4.3 
Butchers 
8 . 3 
4.0 
4.0 
Source: Second New Zealand Sweating Commission, 1990. 
Retail 
average 
7.8 
3.8 
4.1 
National 
average 
8.1 
4.0 
4.5 
Retailing has the lowest ratio of junior to adult rates of any award. This contrasts 
with many other industries and occupations which have no youth rates. In fact, the non-
food award covers cleaners, lift attendants and watchpersons as well as shop assistants and 
there .are no youth rates for these occupations. The lowest rate ~or these workers is $7.08 
for a frrst year cleaner.. While this is still a relatively low rate, it applies to even 15 year 
old cleaners and is above the starting rate for 20 year old shop assistants. It is impossible 
to justify the youth rates in the retail awards on the basis of it being a trainee's rate since 
so very little training is now provided in the industry. In any case, apprentices in the 
craft occupations, who do rec·eive genuine training, receive a higher proportion of the 
qualified craft worker's rate (which translates into an even higher level of wages). 
Table 5: Average hourly earnings in retail as a proportion of average hourly earnings in 
all industrie.sa 
Year 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
Males 
0.85 
0.81 
0.81 
0.75 
Source: Quarterly Employment Survey. 
Note: a Excludes agr.iculture. 
Females 
0.81 
0.85 
0.81 
0.75 
Persons 
0.79 
0.80 
0.78 
0.74 
The fall in wage rates follows the loss of compulsory arbitration since 1985 which 
has strengthened the employers' hand considerably. Whereas a union could previously 
take a dispute of inter~est to arbitration, now they have no means, other than the strike, to 
force employers to concede an award. It is extremely difficult to organize a strike among 
workers in small shops. Employers also have used legaJ devices to tum the system 
further to their advantage. They have managed to argue, for example, that video shops are 
not "lending libraries" and therefore not covered by the non-food award. The Labour 
Court supported this plea, arguing that libraries only lent books. Despite the fact that 
these video "libraries" also sell video tapes, food and other items, the union has not been 
able to achieve coverage under other awards. If such a decision had been made by the 
Arbitration Court before 1985, the union could have forced the ~employers to bargain over 
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a new award specifically for video stores, with the threat of compulsory arbitration if the 
employer would not agree. The new arrangements leave things stalemated, and with 
video store owners holding the advantage. 
The effect on retail pay rates of losing compulsory arbitration is illusttated vividly 
by table 4 which shows how ~etail wage rates have been slipping behind the movement 
in average pay rates. This is backed up by the data in table 5 'Which compares average 
hourly earnings in the r~etail sector with hourly earnings in all induslries. It will be seen 
that retail wages have been slipping behind since the industry has been incr~easingly 
casualized following the reintroduction of Saturday trading in 1980. 
Table ~6: Increases and concessions in the nonfood award 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1985-89 
Average 
% 
18.7 
7.5 
8.1 
4.0 
4.5 
49.9 
Retail 
non-food 
'% 
15.0 
6.75 
7.5 
3.5 
4.0 
42.1 
Concession 
-
-
Nine more trading days atter 6 p.m. 
Weaker proportion clause (i.e. the 
ratio of juniors to seniors) 
Less control on the right to 2 
consecutive days off each week 
Six more 1rading days 
Shorter ,minimum hours for casual 
workers 
A working party to revi~ew overtime 
and penalty rates 
Source: Second New .Zealand Sweating Commission (1990). 
Table 6 expands on the infonnation in table 4 by analysing the movem~ents in the 
non-£ood award since 1985. It will be seen how pay has been progressiv~ely slipping 
behind average wages. But it will be further noted how employers have been able to use 
their greatly incr~eased bargaining power to extract significant concessions, especially 
more flexible opening hours, in return for these minimal increases. Employers used their 
enhanced bargaining strength to de:mand further concessions in the 1990-91 wage round. 
The supermarket and groc~ery award and the butchers award w~ere settled in line with the 2 
percent growth agreement but with the concession that the period of notice which 
employers must give for opening on Sundays, nights or statutory holidays being reduced 
from 4 weeks to 2. The non-food employers demanded various concessions amounting to 
1.. - - - -
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the abolition of all penalty payments and the repeal of the pfotections provided by the 
Shop Trading Hours Repeal Act At the time of writing, the award has not been settled 
and it appears unlikely that it will be. The implementation of the Employm~ent 
Contracts Bill will undoubtedly reduce average earnings further. 
Trading hours 
Shop trading hours have always been of central concern to r~etail workers, and were 
subject to .legislative control from 1892 to 1990. There were 2 threads to this control. 
One related to the desir·e to keep Sunday free from commercial activity. The second 
related to a desire to regulate conditions of work in the r~etail industry (Advisory 
Committee., 1988}. 
Although controls on shop opening hours date back to 1892, employment and 
opening hours were restricted from almost the beginning of British settlement in 1840. 
The English Sunday Observance Act 1780, which prohibited Sunday trading, applied in 
New Zealand from the passage of the English Acts Act 1845. Subsequent New Zealand 
statutes also restricted hours. The Employment of Females Act 1873 limited the 
employment of females and minors, and the Police Offences Act 1884 prohibited Sunday 
trading. 
Aside from these restrictions, thefe were no further controls on opening hours. Thus 
shop .assistants had to work long hours and often unsocial hours. Butchers and som~e 
other categories of shop workers began work very ~early in the morning while workers in 
other types of shops worked to very late at night. Opening hours thus played a major 
part in deteunining the quality of life for shop assistants. An early closing association 
was founded in Auckland as early as 1856. Similar associations were founded in other 
centres within the next decades (Hince et al., 1990). Political action by the Wellington 
Shop Assistants Association was instrumental in obtaining the Factories and Shops Act 
in 1890 and the Shop and Shop Assistants Act in 1892. This struggle to control hours 
played a key role in the founation of shop assistants' unions (Hince et al., 1990).. 
The struggle to control opening hours went through a series of phases. The frrst 
phase was to gain a half day holiday. This was provided by the 1892 Act, which also 
limited weekly hours for women and males aged under 18 to a maximum of 58 hours per 
week. The next phase was to regularize the half day holiday by making half day closing 
mandatory. This was achieved by the 1894 Act. The third phase was to have trading 
hours restricted. 'The lobbying of the unions and the early closing associations, achieved 
this in 1904 (Hince et al., 1990). 
The next phase, having shops shut on Saturday afternoons, was won on a piecemeal 
basis from the 1930s as individual local authorities changed from Wednesday half day and 
Saturday late-night to Saturday half day and Friday late-night (Hince et al., 1990). Once 
shop assistants gained the 40 hour week, Saturday trading virtually ceased. But the retail 
industry was one of the last to ,gain the 40 hour week. 
The First Labour Governm~ent had amended the Induslrial Conciliation and 
Arbittation Act in 1936, reducing maximum hours per w~eek from 48 to 44. The 
amended Act provided for a 40 hour week to be included in awards except where 
employers could show that their business would be unable to operate on that basis. 
When the retail unions lodged claims with the Arbitration Court for a 40 hour week, the 
employers argued that there would be difficulty operating, and this line succeeded (Hince 
et al . , 1990, p.28). Thus hours of work in the retail sector remained at 44 per week until 
1945, when the Shops and Offices Amendment Act introduced the 40 hour week. 
This was the nadir of trading hours. After 1945, a series of legislative and 
administrative changes gradually extended the opening of retail establishments. In part, 
this was a response to a g~enuine public demand, but it ·was legitimizing the behaviour of 
storekeepers who were flagrantly breaking the law. From 1955, a list of "approved 
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goods" was created which defmed goods such as milk, newspapers, and basic foodstuffs 
which could be sold at any time. The list continued to grow and opening hours became 
less restricted. 
Some employers attempted to trade on Saturdays or on more than one night of the 
week. These efforts were resisted by the unions on several fronts. Sporadic strike action 
took place against individual stores that were attempting to open on more than one night. 
Vigorous efforts were put into making representations to the Shop Trading Hours 
Commission and to opposing extensions to the list of exempt goods (Hince et al., 1990, 
ch. 4). The unions also attempted to use the collective bargaining system U> gain some 
control over hours by negotiating penal rates for night and weekend work. From 1979, 
the award provided for double time for Saturday work. Despite these eflorts by the union, 
Saturday trading was reinstated in 1980 by an amendment to the Shop Trading Hours Act. 
The pressure for Saturday trading had come from several directions. The Sunday 
News had campaigned for Saturday trading in 1975 and the National Party, when it 
regained power in 1975, promised that it ·would allow shops to open all day Saturday. 
Retail employers on the other hand, were divided on the issue. Most of the large stores 
were opposed to it 
The changes in opening hours ·were also link~ed indirectly to women's changing 
labour force participation. When the 40 hour w~eek was introduced into shops in 1945, 
the proportion of married women who worked full time w.as only 18 percent. Thus it 
was practical for most families to get their shopping done during normal working time or 
on Friday nights. At the same time., the restricted hours of opening made it difficult for 
married women to work full time. As women's labour force participation incr~eased, it 
had 2 effects. On the one hand, it increased the demand for shopping outside of no1naal 
work hours. On the other hand, the increasing participation provided a supply of women 
available for work in the retail sector and who might be pr~epared to work the less 
conventional hours that extended opening demanded .. 
Shop workers and their unions appreciated the potential effects of Saturday trading 
and fought the proposed change bitterly. Most shop assistants had secme full time jobs 
and, since shop opening hours had been restricted to 5 days for 35 years, there were very 
few left in the industry who had ever worked a 6 day week before. Polls of retail union 
members showed that upwafds of 97 pefcent were opposed to Saturday trading. Nine out 
of 10 also indicated that "being foliced to work on Saturdays would adversely affect their 
family life ... and their reclieational activities" (Hince et al., 1990, p . 48). More to the 
point, 9 out of 10 indicated they were prepared to take industrial action over the issue. 
The intensity of feeling o·ver the trading hours issue was indicated by the campaign 
against the 1977 Shop Trading Hours Bill. " ... mass meetings, :mafches, stop ·works and 
suike action .... underscore( d) the intense feeling roused among shop employee unionists" 
(Hince el a/., 1990, p.49). Despite these protests, the National Government pushed ahead 
with the changes. 
The return to Saturday trading in 1980 completely changed the nature of shopping 
and of retail employment. Saturday, ~especially Saturday morning, became a major 
trading day. Furniture and ~pliance retailers found that it was also a day when families 
browsed. Thus, ev~en if a sale was not concluded on the Saturday. a sale later in the week 
may have originated from the Saturday visit As Saturday trading developed, the pattern 
of demand began shifting from the original hours of 9 a.m to 1 p.m. to a concentration 
around the latter part of the morning. Shops, especially in the central business district, 
responded by opening later. A tendency developed, especially in the suburbs, to close 
later. Thus shop assistants found that they were not even getting a full half day off on 
Saturdays. 
Saturday trading also changed the geographical pattern of demand. 'The demand on 
Saturdays became concentrnted in suburban shopping centres, while the week day demand 
was concentrated in the central business disbicts. Thus the net effect of Saturday trading 
was to shift demand to the suburbs away from the ~central business districts. This r~educed 
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turnover at other times of the week, and the demand for Friday night opening diminished. 
Once shopping was extended to the weekend it required many shop workers to accept a 6 
day working week. It also opened the way for the wholesale casualization of the industry, 
especially in suburban shops which needed a greatly augmented work force on Saturdays. 
Once Saturday trading became frrmly established, pressure began to mount for 
Sunday trading as well. Ironically, the pressure for this came from some of the retailers 
that had sought Saturday shopping a decade before. It also came from the operators of 
"flea markets" and from the real estate companies that owned malls. There was less than 
~ull support for retailers for any further extensions to hours. Many opposed deregulation., 
seeing it as longer hours and higher overheads for the same level of sales. 
Most of the trading in flea markets took place on Saturday, and stall holders knew 
that if they could trade on Sundays as w~ell their turnover would increase very 
substantially. Flea markets challenged the syste.m, on several occasions, by opening on 
Sundays and accepting the fines imposed. They pointed to the high level of patronage 
that they had enjoyed on these well publicized occasions as proof of a general desire for 
Sunday trading. Real estate companies had a very direct interest in Sunday trading, since 
shop rents in malls were set in relation to turnover. What is more, leases for mall shops 
usually specified either that all shops had to be open if the majority opened. Thus, mall 
owners could hardly lose if trading hours were increased. 
The Minister of Labour appointed an Advisory Committee on the Shop Trading 
Hours Act in 1988. The parties appearing before the committee tended to either support 
retention of the existing law or else its total repeal. The Committee, comprising as it did 
a representative of the Distribution Workers Federation and the Retailers Federation with 
a member of the Shop Trading Hours Commission, was unable to recommend between 
these competing views. 
Despite the indetertninacy of the committee, the Labour Government decided to 
deregulate hours anyway. By 1989, the political climate had changed considerably. 
Whereas in 1980 the justification for introducing Saturday trading had been the needs of 
the public for more shopping hours, with a recognition that change would adversely affect 
retail workers, the justification in 1989 was that the economy and the labour market 
needed to be deregulated. Sunday trading was to be a blow for labour mar~et flexibility. 
In late 1989, the Government introduced the Shop Trading Hours Repeal Bill which 
allowed for 24 hour trading on 365 days of the year. Thus it represented a return to the 
situation which applied before 1845. Even before the Bill had been through Parliament, 
the Minister of Labour used regulations to allow 7 day 24 hour trading over the pre-
Christmas period. These regulations were used to extend the period of urilimited opening 
through 1990 until the Bill was passed in July. 
Sunday trading seems to be developing much faster in New Zealand than it did in 
Scotland when Sunday trading was legalized there. Although the majority of shops are 
not opening on Sunday during the .main part of the year, the proportion is increasing 
rapidly. Most supermarkets are now trading on 7 days. New malls are opening 7 days 
and the majority of shops opened every day of the week during December 1989 and again 
during 1990. 
The Shop Trading Hours Act R~epeal Act 1990, enacted in July, made a small 
concession on opening hours in that no trading was peunitted on Waitangi Day, Good 
Friday, Christmas Day or before I pm on Anzac Day. It also offered certain protections 
to workers ·which were to be written into awards or agreements. In essence, the 
protections were to guarantee that ~existing workers should hav~e first choice of any night 
or Sunday work, that workers could not be forced to work at night, on Sundays nor on 
public holidays, and that employers would provide personal security when a worker works 
at night, and transport when public transport is not available. By putting these 
protections into awards, the Government passed their enforcement onto the unions, thus 
abrogating any role for the State in their enforcement. Furtheuno~e, the protections only 
apply to workers covered by the award or agreement. Retail workers who could not get 
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an award, such as assistants in video shops, therefo~e lost twice. They have no 
guaranteed wage, other than the statutory minimum, and they have no protection against 
being forced to work at nights or on Sundays. 
The deregulation of trading hours is virtually complete. The protections in the Act 
do not amount to much. Sunday working has not become a matter of choice for workers. 
When a work:er applies for a job in the retail industry, they are asked whether they will be 
prepared to work on weekends. Workers know they will only be offered the job if they 
say they are prepared to work. There are subtle pressures on established workers to work 
on weekends too. Employers make appeals to company loyalty; not being prepared to 
work on weekends is a sign of "disloyalty•t. There is also the strong feeling of letting 
down one's co-workers. If the others do not want to work on Sundays, it see,ms selfiSh to 
refuse and increase the number of Sundays that others are forced to work. 
3. The quality of work 
Job satisfa ~ction 
As we discussed above, the contemporary New Zealand industry is characterized by 
intense competition and structural instability which is reshaping the organization of 
work, and feducing pay and the quality of work for most shop assistants. Many retail 
employers have gone into "survival mode" and their emphasis is almost solely on the 
return on investments. Thus training is being neglected throughout most of the industry. 
This compares to related industries such as .motor parts where there is a stton,g emphasis 
on training. Emphasis in the retail sector is on newer technologies, and centralized 
purchasing and marketing. There is no place in most managers thinking for training, job 
enrichment or worker motivation,. Job satisfaction is minimal when retail workers are 
instructed "tell don't sell". 
Workers ar~e increasingly being demoralized by the poor performance of their 
industry. And the deskilled management methods are responsible for much of this. There 
is little communication from managers to the workforce. V~ery few workers have a clear 
job description. And many managers have little ~experience in the industry. Overseas 
ownership, and the lack of indigenous experience by for~eign managers, is compounding 
the problem. 
The effects of these policies were stressed very strongly by the workers 'Who appeared 
before the Second Sweating Commission (1990). They explained how they were 
experiencing a loss of self ~esteem. This was so particularly for wor~ers who had been in 
the industry for a long time. 'They were humiliated to discover that their employers saw 
them as disposable units in the quest for profits. They "despise themselves for having to 
be so subservient but the overriding fear of unemployment forces them to accept the 
degrading treatment to which they are subjected" (Second New Zealand Sweating 
Commission, 1990, p.35). Problems of racism, sexism, ageism w~ere fr~equenLly reported 
and the Commission heard of workers being disciplined for being too fat. The S·weating 
Commission was unable to fmd a reason for manag~ement's pettiness. 
The work~ers themselves wer~e unable 'to suggest possible motiv,ation. While ... 
such manag~ement 'tactics were the result of lack of training and showed the 
insecurity of the person conceuted. the effect on the workers was the same: loss 
of self confidence and personal esteem, fear, subservience, broken spirit 
(Second N~ew Zealand Sweating Commission, 1990, p.36). 
The cause of management pettiness ~can be traced most probably to the deskilling of 
the manager's job discussed earlier. As the range of factors over which branch managers 
have discretion is reduced, their job satisfaction is diminished. Staff discipline is one of 
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the few issues over whi~ch they can exert their authority and it is no surprise that they 
become obsessed with staff matters and behave in an authoritarian manner. 
Retail workers derive considerable satisfaction from their interaction with the public 
and from being able to help customers with their purchases. Tighter budgeting, 
understaffing and the increased pace of work make it impossible for many shop assistants 
to give the lev~el of service that they would like to provide. 
Longer trading hours are having particularly ruinous effects on the life of many retail 
workers. These were graphically highlighted by witnesses appearing before the Sweating 
Commission (1990). The witnesses particularly mentioned the loss of time spent with 
families, the increased stress within marriage, the inability 'to socialize with friends and 
neighbours, the impossibility of playing organized sport. Adult witnesses commented 
how this loss of sporting or leisure opportunities affected the personalities of teenagers 
'Who worked on weekends. 
While these longer hours are reducing the quality of work for the existing workers, 
they are creating conditions where employers can recruit from other segments of the 
labour force. Thus employment in most sectors of the industry is beco.ming increasingly 
casualized, and increasing use is being made of women and teenagers. These same 
changes have greatly affected career opportunities for petrnanent employees who are being 
asked to work more intensely and hav~e the added ~esponsibility of supervising the casual 
employees while doing the jobs that employers have not been able w deskill. As a 
consequence, the concept of a car~eer in the industry is disappearing for the majority of 
workers, and training in the industry is running down.7 
Casualization 
It has been observed overseas that extending shop trading hours increases the 
proportion of part time jobs in the industry (Beechey and Perkins, 1987). This has 
certainly been true in New Zealand. The changing pattern of demand following from the 
liberalization of hours has incfeased the attraction to employers of using part time and 
casual labour, and it has gone in hand with the increased availability of casual labour at 
the times of peak demand. Table 7 illustrates the growth in part tiJn,e ~employment which 
has increased more than 60 percent since trading hours were liberaliz·ed in 1980. The 
increasing casualization has undoubtedly paid a part in the relative increase in labour 
turnover in the industry which we discussed above. 
As we noted above, the organizational problems which confront the unions are 
compounded by the increasing casualization and tumov~er of the industry. Casualization 
also affects the quality of work of pe11uanent workers. The effect of penal rates and 
longer opening has been to move some jobs to the weekend and to leave other jobs for 
the week. Some jobs like shelf filling can be done during the week either by casual or by 
full time workers~ Other jobs such as ordering and doing the paper work can be left to 
the main part of the week. This last change has added considerably to the burden of full 
time workers in the non-food sector. Since Saturday is a busy trading day, and a time 
when families do their initial inspection of goods, it is also a day which generates a lot of 
inquiries. Thus full time workers are faced on Monday morning with a substantial pile of 
inquiries and uncompleted paperwork from Saturday's trading. 
7 Evidence presented to the Second New Zealand Sweating Commission from Manakau 
Polytechnic showed how severe the decline in course attendance has been since 1987 
(Evidence presented, 12 February 1990). 
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Table 7: Employment in the retail industry 
Ful1 time Part time Proportion 
Year Male Female Male Female Female Part time 
1975 30 650 29 393 6 231 18 655 0.57 0.29 
1980 31 414 29 200 5 990 21668 0.60 0.31 
1985 32 805 32 582 7 638 25 845 0.59 0.34 
1988 31 730 30 987 10 158 29 451 0.59 0.39 
199()a 33 293 28 104 14 950 30 073 0.55 0.42 
Source: Quarterly employment survey 
Note: a Data collected on a different basis than in p!ievious years. 
Juv ~enalization 
Changes in opening hours, decreased profitability, and penal rates in awards have 
induced employers to make more use of juvenile labour. Junior rates are so low that 
employers can hire a 15 or 16 year old at double time on a Saturday for about the same 
wag~e as an adult receives during the week. 'The Second Sweating Commission (1990) 
heard of 14 year olds working from 4 p.m. to 8.30 p.m. 2 or 3 nights a week and all day 
Saturday. Other evidence revealed that employers w~ere requiring childr~en to take time off 
school to attend training for checkout duties. Employers have used their increased 
bargaining power to exploit this further by forcing the unions to concede a weaker 
proportions clause (table 6). Proportion clauses are of long standing. The Wellington 
Shop Employees Union took a case to the Arbitration Court in 1938 arguing that the 
proportion of seniors to juniors should be 3 to 1 compar~ed to the existing 2 to 1. Hince 
notes that small shops supported this claim because they believed that large stores, who 
were better placed to make use of junior labour had an unfair advantage over them (1990, 
p. 29}. Since then, the ratio has worsened to 1 to 1 and the pfoportions are calculated on 
a weekly basis rather than on an hour by hour basis. 
Some shops, particularly supe1naarkets make maximum use of juniors and hire them 
rather than older workers. These juniors though are entering a dead end job which the 
~employer expects them to quit before they get too old. This employer strategy creates its 
own success. The low pay and zero prospects induce these juniors to leave when they 
find a better job (or ~even if they cannot) and their places ~e taken by other low paid 
juniors. Where juniors stay on, it is not unknown for them to be frred when they 
approach the age at which they would be entitled to an age-r~elated increase or a service 
incremenL These junior workers are often the ones underpaid below the award minimum. 
Working in the retail industry has many effects on school children. Because they 
find it easy to get jobs in the industry, they come to believe that they can easily get jobs 
in other industries too. Thus they are more inclined to leave school with less education, 
and with these false expectations. Their experience as youth workers in this industry also 
shapes their expectations with respect to other jobs. Many of them are unaware of the 
provisions of their award and do not realize that the pay they received ior night and 
weekend work was double the nOIInal rate of pay. But, on the basis of their experience, 
they expect that when they begin full time work they will receive the same or higher pay. 
They also come to believe that the poor conditions, arbitrary management, lack of an 
* - - - -- . ' .... ~ .. 11 
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effective union presence or sexual harassment are no1anal features of the industry or of 
work in general. 
Working part time in the retail industry can begin to create a pressure to drop out of 
school. The assistant principal of a large girls' school wrote to the Second Sweating 
Commission (1990) that when school competed with paid work, all too often school 
lost: "we call it the Food town Syndrome". 
Another teacher wrote to the Commission: 
I realise that for many of the students who work there, the income is an 
important source of independence and a welcome contribution to homes where 
their socio-economic status has consistently been eroded by economic policy. 
Nevertheless, from a teacher's perspective, it severely limits the students' time 
to do homework and study which in tum affects their academic performance. 
Ultimately they revise their future education and career choices to remain in 
supermarket employment because it is seen as better than no job at all (Second 
Sweating Commission, 1990, p.18). 
Feminization 
Some segments of the retail industry are highly feminized while other segments have 
a very low proportion of wo.men. Employ~ers use men and women workers to provide 
f1exibilities in different ways. Whereas flexibilities in male employment are generally 
obtained by having men in full time employment work overtim~e or accepting some 
functional flexibility, flexibilities in female ~employment are obtained by having women 
work on a part time basis and by varying the hours and numbers of these women 
(Beechey and Perkins, 1987). 
Limited opportunities for part time work and discrimination against women in other 
sectors of the economy maintains a supply of women available at the low wages offered 
in the retail trades. As unemployment has risen, the availability of full time jobs has 
declined everywhere and part time employment is the only option for many married 
women who have no access to social welfare benefits. The construction of many jobs 
within the industry as "women's jobs"', especially the part time ones, further reduce the 
opportunities for women within the industry for these are usually dead-end jobs. They 
rarely provide access to the more senior positions such as buyer or manager except in 
"female" areas such as women's clothing, and even here these positions are usually 
reserved for full time workers. Part time workers are the most vulnerable, they ~e less 
likely to be union members and thus have less protection from unscrupulous employers. 
Even the better employers do not always allow part time workers the same privileges as 
full time workers. 
Overall, the proportion of women in the retail labour force increased a little when 
Saturday trading was reintroduced in 1980, and was fairly ,constant at about 60 percent of 
the labour force until 1988. It may hav,e dropped since then as the lJiend to juvenalization 
developed and teenage males, whose hourly rate is about half that of adult women, seem 
to have been preferred for part time jobs. 8 
It is probable that one outcom,e of repealing the Shop Trading Hours Act 1977 and 
enacting the Employment Contracts Bill 1991 will be that women will make up the 
majority of the retail labour force on Sundays and at nights. But this will not necessarily 
increase the quality of their working lives. It is argued by some of the proponents of 
more flexible hours that there will be more employment for women, and that this will 
add to these women's enjoyment of life. They make these arguments on the assumption 
that all women have husbands who will mind children. The actual outcome may well be 
8 Table 7 and ~correspondence from Senior Manager Economic and Business Surveys, 
Department of Statistics, to author, 14 December 1990. 
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an increased burden for these women who will have to combine long hours at work with 
traditional female roles. 
As the liberalized hours become ~established as the norm, employers will intensify 
their demands for penal rates to be abolished or reduced, and therefore the reward for 
working these less favourable hours will be reduced too. Thus, the relative ~earnings of 
women will reduce as well. Beyond these concerns, there is a danger that the greater 
availability of casual or part time work might be used as justification for further reducing 
or removing access to social welfare benefits for solo par~ents. 
Intensification 
Casualization has gone hand in hand with an increasin,g intensification of work. 
Intensification is directly related to opening hours. As the hours of opening lengthen, 
managers employ fewer workers at any one time. What is Jnofe, the incfeased costs 
associated with the longer hours are a further reason tor ~employers ~economizing on labour 
costs by a deliberate policy of understaffing. Casualization fits in w~ell with such a 
policy since casual and part time workers complete their shorter hours before they reach 
the fatigue barrier, and before they are entitled to a paid break. 
As profitability in retailing has declined, most stor~es hav~e reduced staffing levels. 
Staff that left have not been replac~ed and remaining staff have been expected to work 
harder. Evidence given before the Second Sw~eating Commission (1990) revealed that 
some managers press~ed staff into working through tea breaks and lunch hours. Sales 
workers who sold whitewear and brownware were expected to make deliveries or service 
calls on their way to and from work. In the non-food sector, .many workers are expected 
to attend "product knowledge" sessions held before work, or immediately after work. The 
Second Sweating Commission (1990) heard about a number of employers who expected 
their workers to attend these sessions without pay. 
Some of the managers involved gav~e evidence before th~e Commission. 'They 
indicated that t]}ey believed this intensifi.cation to be counter-productive in the longer 
tenn, but they were t:orced by their superiors to go along with such strategies. In many 
cases they were ~orced to adopt these strategies because they were given target wage bills 
(as a percentage of turnover) which they had to meet The only way they could achieve 
these targe'ts was to manage with less staff. 
An indication of the degree of intensification is provided by lhe target wag~e bills 
reported to the Second Sweating Commission (1990). Departmental managers from 
supennarkets reported to the Commission that they were required lO keep wage bills in 
their department below 6 percent of turnover. Subsequent investigation by the author has 
found "superettes'' that aimed for an even low.er wage bill - 3 percent. 
Health and satety 
Many Jietail jobs have become tediously repetitiv~e and a source of repetition strain 
injury (RSI). Using a pricing gun continuously is one source of the syndrome. Butchers 
are becomin.g more prone to RSI too as bu~chering is being continuously deskilled. 
Butchers now carry out a Jieduced variety of tasks and, in supermarkets, may Iiepeat a 
simple operation for a very long time. Sausag~e making, with its repetitive twisting 
motion, often causes RSI. But other butchering tasks hav~e become very repetitiv~e too. 
Butchering is partly perfornaed in abattoirs, and partly in the supe11narket. Meat now 
~comes to supermarkets, partly butchered, in 20 kg packs, and a butcher may spend the 
whole day repeating a simple cutting motion. 
Checkout operators are especially prone to RSI. Initially this illness occwred in the 
hands as a result of keying in prices on ~cash registers. Bar coding has not eliminated this 
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problem. It has merely changed the part of the body being affected. Now the problem is 
becoming one which af~ects elbows and shoulders as heavy items (e.g. 2 litre tubs of ioe 
cream or large joints of meat)9 are moved across the scanners. This problem is 
exacerbated by the poor design of checkout stations in so.me supetanarkets. 
Draughts are a further problem affecting supennarket checkout operators. Checkout 
stations are inevitably close to exits, and cold draughts come in as the doors open and 
shut. Therefore it is not surprising to find that operators suffer a lot from colds and flu . 
Many of the health problems from which retail workers suffer arise from the less 
scrupulous employers evading the requirements of h~ealth and safety legislation. They 
also evade other basic requirements in their attempts to cut costs, such as not providing 
facilities for eating, not having a sick room or using it to hold stock. The winding down 
of the Department of Labour's inspectorate, and the difficulties unions have in gaining 
access, permit these abuses to continue and spread. In some respects, the quality of 
working life has not improved in 100 years. The 1890 Sweating Commission had heard 
complaints that retail workers were not allowed to sit at work. The Second Sweating 
Commission heard similar complaints in 1990 (1990, p.20). 
Prospects 
The way the retail industry develops will significantly detennine the quality of life 
for shop workers and their families. If the present course of development continues, 
for~eign operators, especially Australians, will play a major role in the industry. Most 
probably, the industry will become divided into a top and a bottom, with the top 
comprising stores that sell high grade mefichandise, market it attractively and offer good 
service. The bottom would comprise stores that offer lower quality products, minimal 
service, and which compete solely on the basis of price. This structur~e would be 
completed by a range of small specialist shops which would continue to service market 
niches. Whether these shops would be independent operators is another issue, for, if 
current trends continue, it is likely that many of these would be franchise operations. 
The trend towards franchising is likely to accelerate as the growth of consumer 
legislation puts a gr~eater onus on the retailer, and newer developments such as the use of 
electronic data interchange (ED I) becomes the nottnal fot rn of ordering and invoicing. 
The development of consumer legislation may play a role too in further segmenting the 
retail labour market. As consumer protections develop, retail staff will be required to 
provide accurate product information. In service oriented stores this will have to lead to 
increased staff training for this role. At the other end of the market, it may lead to further 
deskilling as all consumer information is provided in written foran and retail assistants, 
who have already had their jobs reduced to checkout operating, or shelf filling, are 
forbidden to comment to customers on the qualities of products. 
Newer technologies present further opportunities for d~eskilling and destaffing. For 
example the use of computerized scanning has the potential to measure the rate of 
throughput for individual checkout operators (Smith, 1988). The data collected could be 
used to further hone staff numbers at periods of reduced demand. Ther~e is even the 
possibility of using piece rates based on the number, or value, of scans completed. 
The advent of Sunday trading is increasing the pressure for changes to the current 
wage structure. The Employment Contracts Bill, if enacted will ·make this easy for 
~employers to achieve. The provisions of the Bill will make it very difficult for unions to 
organize and their bargaining power will be reduced further. Employers will endeavour to 
abolish penal rates. The outcome, in the better shops, may well be a standard hourly 
9 Irregular objects such as joints of meat are a particularly serious hazard since they do not 
always scan successfully. Thus 2 or more atte.mpts may be needed before the price is 
registered. 
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payment for 7 days of the week. A nornaal week might comprise any 5 days out of the 7, 
with a premium for working unsocial hours. Overtime rates would be payable for 
working a sixth day or longer hours on a standanJ day. In the worse shops, there may be 
no overtime rates at all. 
The quality of work ·will certainly decrease for most workers because it will be 
difficult to avoid working unsocial hours. Even worse, as hours of opening lengthen, 
employers may ~endeavour to cut costs further by utilizing split shifts. Many workers 
would be required to work on I. and possibly 2, weekend days with their days off during 
the week. It is ~even possible that once Sunday trading becomes fully established, shops 
'might close on Monday or another week day. These changes might halt the tendency 
towards casualization, but, if penal rates disappear, they would reduce the income of those 
workers who were forced to work on the weekend. 
The most significant change to the indus·try will come if trends towards more 
casualization and juvenalization ~continue. If the Employment ·Contracts Bill 1990 is 
enacted, the unions' memberships will be seriously eroded. But, either way, it will be 
worse if the industry becomes more casualized. The more casualized the industry, the 
harder it will be for unions to organize and the.refofe the lower their memberships. 'The 
lower their ·membe·rships, the lesser their ~esources, and therefofe the lesser their capacity 
to enforce existing agreements or 'to negotiate new ones. It will become much easier then 
for unscrupulous employers to further ~exploit retail workers. 
4. Conclusi ~on 
The retail industry is going through a difficult time, but as the frrst section of the 
paper demonstrated, the causes of those difficulties are complex and beyond the control of 
.many fitrns in the industry. The persistence of these difficulties highlights the 
limitations of labour ·market flexibility as a panacea for the mor;e g.eneral problems that 
beset particular ftrms, or even whole industries. Despite virtually unlimited trading 
hours, the possibilities of labour substitution offered by deskilling, the decline in real pay 
levels achieved since 1984., and the structure of the industry making trade union 
organization extrem~ely difficult, most segments of the retail sector are still in a perilous 
state. If anything, the advantages which the ~current state of the labour market offers to 
retail ~employers is perpetuating the existence of badly managed shops, or shops in poor 
locations. Although these shops remain unprofitable, the implicit subsidy they receive 
from their workers· low pay and intensified work is delaying their inevitable closure. 
Against the limited benefit to employers of these flexibilities is the cost to workers 
in the industry, to their families and to society. The costs to workers include reduced job 
satisfaction, the disappearance of career opportunities, an increased pace of work, having 
to work at unsocial hours, continually r~educing levels of real pay and the pain of RSI. 
Their families hav~e to share, directly and indir~ectly in some of these costs and, in 
addition, have their lives disrupted by having husbands, wiv·es or childr·en having to work 
at inconvenient times and having time together as a family eroded by the demands of the 
industry. Society in general also shares these costs. The juvenalization of some sectors 
disrupts schooling and weekend trading makes playing organized sport impossible for 
thousands of teenagers. Moreover, ·the publi~c health system has to deal with RSI and 
other illnesses which result from the organization of shop work. Shop customers gain 
little if anything from the abolition of legal regulation. They have to contend with less 
service as shops become more thinly staffed, or move incr~easingly to self-service. The 
only benefit to society is an extension of shopping hours; a benefit which surveys 
sho·wed most people did not want (Advisory Committee on the Shop Trading Hours .Act, 
1988). 
The future of the New .Zealand retail industry will not be detet anined by changes in 
the degree of labour market flexibility. Sacrifices forced onto groups of workers will do 
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little to stem the decline of sub-sectors of the industry or of particular fn1ns. Rather the 
future structure of the industry will be detetanined by the dynamics of competition within 
the industry, changes in the whole economy and international trends. It is these factors 
which will deteuuine which f11n1s survive and which fu·1ns disappear. 
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